search query: @author Faleye, O. / total: 3
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| Author: | Faleye, O. |
| Title: | Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2007 : FEB, VOL. 83:2, p. 501-529 |
| Index terms: | management executive remuneration board of directors |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | It is examined how classified boards (here as: clsd-bs.) entrench management (as: mgmt.) by focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, and shareholder proposals. It is shown that clsd-bs. destroy value by entrenching mgmt. and reducing director effectiveness. Classified boards are shown to be associated with a significant reduction in firm value. The results indicate that clsd-bs. significantly insulate mgmt. from market discipline. |
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