search query: @author Osma, B.G. / total: 3
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Author:Osma, B.G.
Title:Board independence and real earnings management: the case of R&D expenditure
Journal:Corporate governance
2008 : MAR, VOL. 16:2, p. 116-131
Index terms:board of directors
agency theory
earnings
R&D
expenditure
companies
United Kingdom
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper explores the role of boards of directors in constraining research and development (R&D) spending manipulation. Based on a large sample of U.K. firms, it is studied whether independent boards are efficient at detecting and constraining myopic R&D cuts. The results indicate among others that more independent boards constrain the manipulation of R&D expenditure.
SCIMA record nr: 266148
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