search query: @author Cantor, R. / total: 3
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| Author: | Cantor, R. |
| Title: | Work effort and contract length. |
| Journal: | Economica
1988 : AUG, VOL. 55:219, p. 343-353 |
| Index terms: | LABOUR MARKETS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS PRODUCTIVITY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A worker can be induced to put forth unobservable effort if he knows that his wage in future contracts will be related to his past overall productivity. As contract length is increased, the worker is more likely to shirk because the present value of future wage revisions associated with shirking is reduced. The optimal contract length minimizes the sum of explicit contracting cost and cost of shirking. |
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