search query: @author Cleeton, D. L. / total: 3
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| Author: | Cleeton, D. L. |
| Title: | Equilibrium Conditions for Efficient Rent Seeking: The Nash-Cournot Solution |
| Journal: | Quarterly Review of Economics and Business
1989 : SUMMER, VOL. 29:2, p.6-14 |
| Index terms: | OPERATIONAL RESEARCH GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper formalizes a model of rent- seeking behavior developed by Tullock. Among others, it is demonstrated that the maximizing behavior of risk-neutral rent seekers places bounds on the parameter of the model describing the the marginal cost function for rent seeking and that these bounds depend on the number of rent seekers. The author examines the implications for the rent- seeking ratio. The model is generalized for the case where the number of rent seekers are endogenously determined by entry and exit. |
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