search query: @author Cantor, R. / total: 3
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| Author: | Cantor, R. |
| Title: | Firm-specific training and contract length. |
| Journal: | Economica
1990 : FEB, VOL. 57:225, p. 1-14 |
| Index terms: | CONTRACTS TRAINING WAGES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | If wages are subject to continuous renegotiation, the ex post bargaining division of the quasi-rents is unlikely to provide the correct ex ante incentives for the creation of firm-specific human capital if training requires both firm investment and worker effort. An intermediate contract length is desirable, because if contracts are too long, the worker anticipates too little in the way of post-contract rewards and shirks during training. It is shown that intermediate-length, fixed-wage contracts induce more efficient training investment and effort than career-long, fixed-wage contracts or continuous, spot-market, wage renegotiations. |
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