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Author:Benveniste, L. M.
Spindt, P. A.
Title:How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
1989 : OCT, VOL. 24:2, p. 343-361
Index terms:INVESTMENT BANKS
NEW ISSUES
CONTRACTS
DISTRIBUTION
PRICES
Language:eng
Abstract:It is investigated how investment bankers use indications of interest from their client investors to price and allocate new issues. The results show that new issues will be underpriced and that distributional priority will be given to an underwriter's regular investors. It is found that tension between an underwriter's propensity to presell an issue and an issuing firm's desire to obtain maximum proceeds affects the type of underwriting contract chosen.
SCIMA record nr: 76025
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