search query: @author Kale, J. R. / total: 3
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| Author: | Kale, J. R. Noe, T. H. |
| Title: | Risky debt maturity choice in a sequential game equilibrium |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Research
1990 : SUM, VOL. 13:2, p.155-165 |
| Index terms: | OPERATIONAL RESEARCH GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors investigate the choice of risky debt maturity structure in a sequential game framework. It is assumed that there are no transaction costs with the choice of the debt maturity structure. It is proven that for time- invariant firm value changes both short- and long-term debt pooling are Nash sequential equilibrium outcomes. However, only the first one satisfies the universal divinity refinement. |
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