search query: @author Tamaki, M. / total: 3
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| Author: | Tamaki, M. |
| Title: | A secretary problem with uncertain employment and best choice of available candidates. |
| Journal: | Operations Research
1991 : MAR-APR, VOL. 39:2, p. 274-284 |
| Index terms: | SELECTION OF PERSONNEL DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The classical secretary problem is considered, where n candidates appear one-by-one in random order with all n! permutations equally likely. The candidates that have so far appeared are ranked according to some order of preference. As each candidate appears, it must be decided whether or not to make an offer to that candidate with the objective of maximizing the probability of choosing the best candidate. According to when the availability of a candidate can be ascertained, two models are considered. The availability is ascertained only by giving an offer of employment /MODEL 1/, while the availability is ascertained just after the arrival of the candidate /MODEL 2/. |
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