search query: @author Hakimi, S. L. / total: 3
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| Author: | Labbe, M. Hakimi, S. L. |
| Title: | Market and locational equilibrium for two competitors. |
| Journal: | Operations Research
1991 : SEP-OCT, VOL. 39:5, p. 749-756 |
| Index terms: | LOCATION PROBLEM EQUILIBRIUM THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A two-stage location and allocation game involving two competing firms is examined. The firms select the location of their facility on a network, then they optimally select the quantities each wishes to supply to the markets, which are located at the vertices of the network. The criterion for optimality for each firm is maximizing its profit, which is the total revenue minus the costs. Under reasonable assumptions, it is shown that there is a Nash equilibrium for the quantities offered at the markets by each firm. Furthermore , if the quantities supplied by each firm at each market are positive, then there is also a Nash locational equilibrium, i. e., no firm finds it advantageous to change its location. |
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