search query: @indexterm TIME / total: 304
reference: 139 / 304
| Author: | Kocherlakota, N. |
| Title: | Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : JUL, VOL. 15:1, p. 33-54 |
| Index terms: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR TIME |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines a game in which an infinitely lived decision maker with inconsistent preferences makes choices over time. There are typically many subgame perfect equilibria to this game; the author describes a refinement of subgame perfection the she terms reconsideration- proofness. There is always a reconsideration-proof equilibrium and all reconsideration-proof equilibrium paths provide the same utility to the decision maker. The author shows that reconsideration-proofness is relevant for macroeconomic policy games. |
SCIMA