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| Author: | Hoeberichts, M. Tesfaselassie, M.F. Eijffinger, S. |
| Title: | Central bank communication and output stabilization |
| Journal: | Oxford Economic Papers
2009 : APR, VOL. 61:2, p. 395-411 |
| Index terms: | financial markets central banks communication |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Central banks (henceforth as: c-bks.) all-over the world have a reputation for being secretive about their operations and market assessments. C-bks. are sometimes argued to need flexibility and therefore being not able to be fully transparent. This explanation is not found to carry through in a forward-looking New Keynesian framework, where transparency (here as: trspy.) about the c-bks.'s forecasting procedures improves output stabilization (as: stbln). It is also shown that higher trspy. increases optimal conservatism, as the benefits from higher trspy. as to the output stbln. are greater the more conservative is the central bank. |
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