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| Author: | Kalyta, P. |
| Title: | Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: A study of supplemental retirement plans |
| Journal: | Strategic Management Journal
2009 : APR, VOL. 30:4, p. 405-423 |
| Index terms: | chief executive officers executive remuneration financial planning management compensation pay retirement Canada theories |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this study, it is argued that the impact of managerial (henceforth as: mgr-al.) power over boards on mgr-al. pay, and thus the deviation of compensation (as: cmpst.) contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of mgr-al. cmpst. Explored is the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the cmpst. transparency theory. SERPs benefits are found to be primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent cmpst. components are primarily driven by economic factors. In addition, the results also suggest that CEOs with contingent SERPs on firm performance seem to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. |
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