search query: @indexterm corporate structure / total: 320
reference: 5 / 320
« previous | next »
Author:Smart, S. B.
Zutter, C. J.
Title:Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison of dual and single-class IPOs
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2003 : JUL, VOL. 69:1, p. 85-110
Index terms:Initial public offerings
Pricing
Corporate structure
Company ownership
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors find that dual-class firms experience less underpricing than single-class firms and explore several hypotheses which explain this phenomenon. Compared to single-class firms, dual-class companies have slightly higher post-IPO institutional ownership and experience fewer control events. Although dual-class firms achieve a lower underpricing cost, they trade at lower prices relative to earnings and sales than single-class IPOs. This pricing differential, combined with evidence that dual-class managers earn higher compensation and that dual-class shares are common among media and entertainment industry IPOs, suggests that dual-class ownership structures protect private control benefits.
SCIMA record nr: 250925
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA