search query: @indexterm GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING / total: 34
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| Author: | Persson, T. Tabellini, G. |
| Title: | Federal fiscal constitutions: Risk sharing and redistribution |
| Journal: | Journal of Political Economy
1996 : OCT, VOL. 104:5, p. 979-1009 |
| Index terms: | GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING PUBLIC FINANCE TRANSFER PAYMENTS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers. Specifically, it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions, where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments. Realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a trade-off between risk sharing and redistribution. Different constitutions produce very different results. In particular, a federal social insurance scheme, chosen by voting, provides overinsurance, whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme, chosen by bargaining, provides underinsurance. |
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