search query: @indexterm POLLUTION / total: 343
reference: 73 / 343
| Author: | Sunnevåg, K. J. |
| Title: | Auction design for the allocation of emission permits in the presence of market power |
| Journal: | Environmental and Resource Economics
2003 : NOV, VOL. 26:3, p. 385-400 |
| Index terms: | Environmental economics Pollution Auctions Imperfect competition Oligopoly |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. Two "competing" ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction, or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy. |
SCIMA