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| Author: | Cason, T. N. Gangadharan, L. Duke, C. |
| Title: | A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution |
| Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2003 : NOV, VOL. 46:3, p. 446-471 |
| Index terms: | auctions land use pollution regulations |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. A laboratory experiment, in which landholder/sellers in sealed-offer auctions compete to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the regulator to subsidize abatement, is presented. In one treatment the regulator reveals to landholders the environmental benefits estimated for their projects , and in other treatment the regulator conceals the potential projects' "environmental quality". The results suggest that sellers' offers misrepresent their costs more for high-quality projects when quality is revealed, so total abatement is lower and seller profits higher when landholders know their projects' environmental benefits. |
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