search query: @indexterm agricultural policy / total: 35
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| Author: | Kampas, A. White, B. |
| Title: | Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution |
| Journal: | Ecological Economics
2003 : DEC, VOL. 47:2-3, p. 135-147 |
| Index terms: | Agricultural policy Bargaining Pollution Pollution control |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A primary justification for using transferable permits for pollution control is that they achieve a given level of emission reduction at the lowest cost. The initial allocation of pollution permits have significant on equity, although it does not have an impact in terms of efficiency. This article examines a variety of permit allocation rules for a small catchment in South West England. It employs an asymmetric Nash bargaining framework to characterise agents' co-operative behaviour and to explain their likely preferences over permit allocation rules. |
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