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| Author: | Milgrom, P. Roberts, J. |
| Title: | Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : NOV, VOL. 17:1, p. 113-128 |
| Index terms: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR EQUILIBRIUM THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are "coalition-proof". The authors show that the existence of a Pareto-best element in the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies implies the existence of a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium for any specification of coalitional communication possibilities that always permits individual deviations. |
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