search query: @author Roberts, J. / total: 36
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| Author: | Athey, S. Roberts, J. |
| Title: | Organizational Design: Decision Rights and Incentive Contracts |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
2001 : MAY, VOL. 91:2, p. 200-205 |
| Index terms: | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN INCENTIVES CONTRACTS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper the authors investigate where decision rights should be lodged in organizations. The authors assume that it is not possible to contract on investment projects, nor can the principal bargain with the agents over the adoption of these projects once they are identified. Instead, returns to projects are reflected in the performance measures available for use in the effort-incentive contracting. Then the incentives for effort and for decisions are inextricably tied together. In this framework, the authors explore the interactions among the design of jobs and assignment of individuals to tasks, the shape and intensity of effort incentives, and the allocation of authority over project selection. The authors argue that it may indeed be optimal to assign decisions rights to someone other than the best-informed party. |
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