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| Author: | Hyde, C. |
| Title: | Bargaining and delay: the role of external information |
| Journal: | Theory and Decision
1997 : JAN, VOL. 42:1, p. 81-104 |
| Index terms: | BARGAINING ROLES INFORMATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the notion that delay in reaching agreement in bargaining may be caused by learning that is independent of the bargaining procedure. In particular, learning is not due to inference from the observed offers and responses of the opponent, but derives from observation of an exogenous, costly signal - the author calls this "investigation". First he observes that even if learning is costless and perfectly informative, investigation may not occur in equilibrium. |
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