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| Author: | Fabella, R. |
| Title: | Generalized sharing, membership size and pareto efficiency in teams |
| Journal: | Theory and Decision
2000 : FEB, VOL. 48:1, p. 47-60 |
| Index terms: | PARETO LAW TEAM WORK ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The author first shows that the Generalized Sharing mechanism which is exhaustive, allows a team of identical members voluntarily supplying the observable effort to attain Pareto efficient production under increasing returns provided team size is allowed to vary. The author then shows that where true effort is imperfectly observable (moral hazard) Pareto efficient production under nonconstant returns to scale is still attainable by varying team size. |
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