search query: @indexterm TRADE BARRIERS / total: 389
reference: 17 / 389
« previous | next »
Author:Cadot, O.
Melo, J. de
Olarreaga, M.
Title:The Protectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks: Evidence from Mercosur
Journal:Journal of International Economics
2003 : JAN, VOL. 59:1, p. 161-182
Index terms:INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
TRADE POLICY
TRADE BARRIERS
Language:eng
Abstract:In a political-economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, it is shown that full duty-drawbacks are granted to exporters. This in turn decreases their incentives to counter-lobby against high tariffs on their inputs. In equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these goods. The creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium. Duty-drawbacks will be eliminated on intra-regional exports, which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra-regional exporters. Evidence from Mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports led to increased counter-lobbying by users of intermediate products.
SCIMA record nr: 252394
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA