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Author:Bernardo, A. E.
Cai, H.
Luo, J.
Title:Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2001 : SEP, VOL. 61:3, p. 311-344
Index terms:ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
CAPITAL BUDGETING
COMPENSATION
INVESTMENT
MORAL HAZARD
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for decentralized firms when division managers have an incentive to mispresent project quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing effort. The authors show that in the optimal mechanism firms always underinvest in capital relative to a naive application of the net present value (NPV) rule.
SCIMA record nr: 226262
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