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| Author: | King, I. Welling, L. |
| Title: | Commitment, efficiency and footloose firms. |
| Journal: | Economica
1992 : FEB, VOL. 59:233, p. 63-73 |
| Index terms: | EFFICIENCY COMPANIES ECONOMETRIC MODELS COMPETITION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors explore the consequences of the possibility of relocation upon the equilibrium division of the surplus. They show that the efficiency of the equilibrium is sensitive to the degree of commitment power of the firm and local governments. A dynamic model is constructed where, in each period, a firm deals with two local governments. Two cases are considered: one where all agents can commit, in the first period, to second period actions, and one where they cannot. |
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