search query: @author Nyberg, S. / total: 4
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| Author: | Nyberg, S. |
| Title: | Reciprocal shareholding and takeover deterrence |
| Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1995 : SEP, VOL. 13:3, p. 355-372 |
| Index terms: | SHAREHOLDERS MERGERS COMPENSATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Reciprocal shareholding has been argued to increase managerial power and facilitate takeover resistance. The latter may translate into higher premiums in the event of an actual takeover, thus benefiting shareholders, whereas increased influence over broad decisions induces too high managerial compensation. The net effect is determined by the efficiency of the incumbent management relative to outside entrepreneurs. If the profitability of receiving a tender offer is high, shareholders are likely to benefit from crosswise shareholdings. |
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