search query: @author Morasch, K. / total: 4
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| Author: | Morasch, K. |
| Title: | Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1995 : SEP, VOL. 28:1, p. 63-78 |
| Index terms: | R&D CONTRACTS MORAL HAZARD |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to explain the use of different governance models for R&D cooperation. The authors argue that (ex ante) cross-licensing agreements are preferred to R&D joint ventures if potential synergy effects are negligible and the double moral hazard problem caused by unobservable R&D effort can be solved by an appropriate royalty scheme. It is shown that the first best effort decisions are implementable by a cross-licensing agreement if royalty payments are based on R&D success. However, if payments have to be based on actual know-how transfer because R&D success is not verifiable, there are cases where joint ventures are necessary to induce optimal R&D effort. |
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