search query: @author Rubin, J. / total: 4
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| Author: | Kling, C. Rubin, J. |
| Title: | Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
1997 : APR, VOL. 64:1, p. 101-115 |
| Index terms: | ENVIRONMENT POLLUTION CONTROL BANKING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Banking or borrowing of emission permits to meet a series of emission standards over time are being considered and implemented by policy makers seeking ways to make meeting environmental standards less costly. This study examines incentives for emission banking and borrowing from the perspective of the individual firm and the socially optimal allocation of emissions and output. A simple intertemporal model of firm decision making is presented to investigate the properties of bankable permits. It was found that firms may have an incentive to bank permits when marginal abatement costs are rising, marginal production costs are falling, emission standards are declining, or output prices are rising, by examining output and emission streams under a variety of circumstances. |
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