search query: @author Harms, P. / total: 4
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| Author: | Boes, D. Harms, P. |
| Title: | Mass privatization, management control and efficiency |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
1997 : JUN, VOL. 64:3, p. 343-357 |
| Index terms: | PRIVATIZATION ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT CONTROL |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors present a model where a government chooses the number of individuals to which ownership in a former state-owned firm shall be allocated. When making this decision the government maximizes the political support it gets from the firm's incumbent manager and from potential shareholders, anticipating that a greater dispersion of shares reduces the control of the manager by the firm's new owners. It turns out that shares will be allocated to the maximum number of individuals - and thus a policy of mass privatization will be implemented - if the manager's utility enters the political support function with a higher weight than the welfare of the potential shareholders. |
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