search query: @author Palfrey, T. R. / total: 4
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| Author: | Jackson, M. O. Palfrey, T. R. |
| Title: | Efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1998 : NOV, VOL. 66:6, p. 1353-1388 |
| Index terms: | BARGAINING IMPLEMENTATION EFFICIENCY |
| Freeterms: | MATCHING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study examines a simple bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. Efficiency is characterized in such a dynamic setting and the study discusses how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. The allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form, are studied. The efficient allocations are compared and contrasted with those that could ever arise as the equilibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure. |
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