search query: @author Albaek, S. / total: 4
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| Author: | Albaek, S. Overgaard, P. B. |
| Title: | Receiver discretion in signalling models: Information transmission to competing retailers |
| Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1998 : MAR, VOL. 16:2, p. 209-228 |
| Index terms: | Wholesaling Prices Retailing Competition Models |
| Freeterms: | Receiver discretion |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper draws attention to the fact that receiver discretion is an integral aspect of any economic situation in which signalling considerations are important. The main point of the paper is illustrated in a model of a manufacturer, privately informed about the strength of demand, with a number of competing retailers. It is shown that the manufacturer will not distort his wholesale price, as is usual in separating equilibria, if the retail competition is sufficiently intense, and the retailers' discretion in their price decisions therefore limited, whether as a consequence of a large number of retailers or of the retailers' products being close substitutes. |
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