search query: @author Panunzi, F. / total: 4
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| Author: | Burkart, M. Gromb, D. Panunzi, F. |
| Title: | Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
2000 : APR, VOL. 55:2, p. 647-678 |
| Index terms: | AGENCY THEORY CONFLICT COMPANY CONTROL |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors analyze control transfers in firms with a dominant minority blockholder and otherwise dispersed owners, and show that the transaction mode is important. Negotiated block trades preserve a low level of ownership concentration, inducing more inefficient extraction of private benefits. In contrast, public acquisitions increase ownership concentration, resulting in fewer private benefits and higher firm value. |
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