search query: @author Rocheteau, G. / total: 4
reference: 3 / 4
| Author: | Rocheteau, G. |
| Title: | Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2002 : JUN, VOL. 84:3, p. 387-425 |
| Index terms: | Working conditions Hours of work Unemployment Moral hazard |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the consuquences of a working time reduction within an integrated shirking-matching model. Under "laissez faire", workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When unemployment is high, the no-shirking condition is binding and the number of working hours is lower than the level that would be negotiated in the absence of unobservable shirking. In this case, a work-sharing policy increases aggregate employment. At the opposite, for low unemployment countries, the no-shirking condition does not bind and a working time regulation always worsens the labour market situation. |
SCIMA