search query: @author Malmendier, U. / total: 4
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| Author: | Güner, A.B. Malmendier, U. Tate, G. |
| Title: | Financial expertise of directors |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2008 : MAY, VOL. 88:2, p. 323-354 |
| Index terms: | board of directors corporate governance executives finance |
| Freeterms: | expertise |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses how directors with financial (here as: fin.) expertise affect corporate decisions. Based on a novel panel data set, it is found that fin. experts exert significant influence, not necessarily in the interest of shareholders, though. External funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases with commercial bankers joining boards. However, the increased financing flows to firms with good credit but poor investment opportunities. Similarly, investment bankers on boards are associated with larger bond issues but worse acquisitions. There is little evidence found that fin. experts affect compensation policy. The results suggest that increasing fin. expertise on boards may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests are neglected. |
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