search query: @author Kiyono, K. / total: 4
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| Author: | Suzumura, K. Kiyono, K. |
| Title: | Entry barriers and economic welfare. |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
1987 : JAN, VOL. 54:177, p. 157-167 |
| Index terms: | WELFARE ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi-Cournot market is examined. The existence of a strong government that can enforce the marginal-cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms is presupposed. It is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free-entry quasi-Cournot equilibrium vis-a-vis the "first best" welfare maximizing number of firms. The thrust of this result essentially survives even if an utopian "first best" government is replaced by a "second-best" government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms. |
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