search query: @indexterm FINANCIAL REGULATION / total: 40
reference: 37 / 40
| Author: | Casella, A. |
| Title: | Participation in a currency union |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
1992 : SEP, VOL. 82:4, p.847-863 |
| Index terms: | CURRENCY CURRENCY MARKETS BANKS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL REGULATION INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In any voluntary cooperative agreement, the potential gain from deviation should determine the minimum influence required over common decision-making. The problem of the distribution of power within the common central bank is addressed. A highly asymmetrical distribution of power between two partners is observed not to be sustainable if the choice variables are strategic substitutes. A simple general-equilibrium model of a monetary union is studied, and it is shown that a small economy will not take part in the agreement unless it can secure influence that is more than proportional to its size and a transfer of seigniorage revenues in its favor. |
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