search query: @indexterm FINANCIAL REGULATION / total: 40
reference: 13 / 40
| Author: | Admati, A. Pfleiderer, P. |
| Title: | Forcing firms to talk: financial disclosure and externalities |
| Journal: | Review of Financial Studies
2000 : FALL, VOL. 13:3, p. 479-520 |
| Index terms: | FINANCE FINANCIAL REGULATION EXTERNALITIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation. In the authors' model disclosure is costly, it has private and social value, and its precision is endogenous. The authors show that (i) a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy; (ii) the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient; and (iii) regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare. |
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