search query: @indexterm BARGAINING / total: 425
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| Author: | Epple, D. (et al.) |
| Title: | Profiling in bargaining over college tuition |
| Journal: | Economic Journal
2006 : NOV, VOL. 116:515, p. F459-479 |
| Index terms: | education colleges students bargaining game theory models USA |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Profiling in college (hereafter as: c-e./c-es.) admissions (here as: adm./adms.) arises when applicant attributes are given weight due to their correlation with unobservable student characteristics valued by the c-e. This article models the adm. process of a single c-e. as a bargaining game btw. the c-e. and a potential student with asymmetric information etc. The model's empirical (as: emp.) implications are tested using a unique data set from a private U.S. c-e. It is found that the emp. evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the c-e. adm. process. |
SCIMA