search query: @indexterm RESOURCE ALLOCATION / total: 426
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| Author: | Budde, J. Göx, R. F. Luhmer, A. |
| Title: | Absprachen beim Groves-Mechanismus - eine spieltheoretische Untersuchung |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1998 : VOL. 50:1, p. 3- 20 |
| Index terms: | DIVISIONALISED COMPANIES RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME THEORY |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | Economic literature has proposed several incentive mecha- nisms in order to induce agents in divisionalized organiza- tions to reveal their private information. Among these mechanisms the class of Groves mechanisms has the dis- tinguishing property of implementing truthful reporting as an equilibrium in dominant strategies. However, critiques maintain that agents may collude and transmit false informa- tion to headquarters. This paper demonstrates that the agents' collusion game results in a prisoners' dilemma because agents cannot credibly commit themselves to play the collusive message strategies. The paper also outlines an organizational setting to enhance the plausibility of the fundamental assumptions underlying the Groves/Loeb approach, in which payoffs are observable ex post so that compensation contracts can be based on them. |
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