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| Author: | Göx, R. F. |
| Title: | Pretiale Lenkung als Instrument der Wettbewerbsstrategie |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1998 : VOL. 50:3, p. 260-288 |
| Index terms: | TRANSFER PRICING RESOURCE ALLOCATION MARKETING STRATEGY DECENTRALISATION PROFIT CENTRES COMPETITION |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | One of the major functions of transfer pricing is the optimal coordination of internal trade between responsibility centers in decentralized firms. According to standard theory the efficient level of internal trade is achieved by marginal cost pricing. If one of the firm's profit centers faces duopolistic competition on the final product market, the firm's headquarters can gain a strategic advantage when it systematically distorts the transfer price. Because headquaters cannot credibly commit to the equilibrium strategy that is induced by transfer pricing, the market outcome achieved by strategic transfer pricing cannot serve as credibly precommitments unless they are employed for other than strategic reasons, the applicability of the basis concept is limited to observable transfer prices. |
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