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Author:Faure-Grimaud, A.
Title:Product market competition and optimal debt contracts: the limited liability effect revisited
Journal:European Economic Review
2000 : DEC, VOL. 44:10, p. 1823-1840
Index terms:PRODUCT MARKETING
COMPETITION
DEBT
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper shows that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers plays a crucial role in the existence of interactions between financial decisions and output market strategies. Lenders offer an optimal, renegotiation- proof financial contract which resembles a standard debt contract. Computing Cournot equilibria, debt causes firms to compete less aggressively: the usual (positive) limited liability effect on quantities is offset by a negative one due to (endogenous) financial costs.
SCIMA record nr: 222877
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