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| Author: | Arnold, M.C. Ponick, E. Schenk-Mathes, H.Y. |
| Title: | Groves mechanism vs. profit sharing for corporate budgeting - An experimental analysis with preplay communication |
| Journal: | European Accounting Review
2008 : VOL. 17:1, p. 37-63 |
| Index terms: | finance budgeting profit sharing |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally explores the efficiency of the Groves mechanism (henceforth as: G-m.) and a profit sharing scheme (as: p-s-s.) in the context of corporate budgeting. The effects of anonymous communication on both incentive schemes are especially examined. It is shown that although the G-m. is analytically superiour to the p-p-s., the latter turns out to be advantageous for headquarters in this experiment etc. |
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