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| Author: | Singh, M. Davidson, W. N. III |
| Title: | Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms |
| Journal: | Journal of Banking and Finance
2003 : MAY, VOL. 27:5, p. 793-816 |
| Index terms: | Company ownership Agencies Costs Corporate governance Board of directors |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors find that in large firms managerial ownership is positively related to asset utilization but does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Outside block ownership may only have a limited effect on reducing agency costs. Furthermore, smaller boards serve the same role, but independent outsiders on a board do not appear to protect the firm from agency costs. In large corporations managerial ownership significantly alleviates principal-agent conflicts even in the presence of other agency deterrent mechanisms. |
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