search query: @indexterm risk sharing / total: 46
reference: 43 / 46
« previous | next »
Author:Posselt, T.
Title:Erfolgsbeteiligung bei Aktivitäts- und Risikoverbund
Journal:Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1997 : VOL. 67:3, p. 361-384
Index terms:PAY INCENTIVES
EQUAL PAY
RISK SHARING
TOP MANAGEMENT
MANAGERS
INTERDEPENDENCY
Language:ger
Abstract:The development of incentive payment-systems usually builds on the relationship between top management and a division manager. This is reflected by the deduced proposition that the optimal payment consists of a fixed and a profit-dependent component. Cross-division relations are neglected. This paper analyses the effects on optimal incentive pay when interdependencies between divisions exist. Performance-related interdependencies require coordination between divisions. It is shown that a modified payment-system can achieve the desired incentives when the manager s payment depends on a third component assessing the value of the manager s performance for the other division.
SCIMA record nr: 156230
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA