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| Author: | Schnedler, W. |
| Title: | Ergebnissignale in Prinzipal-Agent-Modellen mit mehreren Aktionen |
| Journal: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
2003 : VOL. 73:4, Ergänzungsheft, p. 1-18 |
| Index terms: | Financial models Agency theory Market information Asymmetric information |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | In multitasking models, incentive schemes have two functions: they motivate the worker to exert effort and they influence the allocation of effort. Performance signals, the expected value of which coincides with the principal's payoff, are of special interest as they can be used to induce the agent to internalise the relative importance of different efforts to the principal. Indeed, drastic misallocations which lead to the break-down of incentive schemes can be avoided. This suggests that an agent, whose payoff depends entirely on such signals, will allocate effort according to the preferences of the principal. This article shows that nevertheless misallocation can occur and it provides conditions under which the principal uses additional signals to correct for this misallocation (original in German). |
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