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| Author: | Kraft, K. Niederprüm, A. |
| Title: | Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1999 : SEP, VOL. 40:1, p. 17-27 |
| Index terms: | Management Pay Company ownership Theories |
| Freeterms: | Management incentives |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The salaries of top managers consist of two parts: one part depending on profits, the other being constant. In a model of management compensation schemes with risk averse agents, Holmström and Milgrom (1987) predict that increasing variance in profits ought to reduce the profit-relatedness of salaries. The data used in this study is from Germany. |
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