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| Author: | Volpin, P. F. |
| Title: | Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2002 : APR, VOL. 64:1, p. 61-90 |
| Index terms: | Investor protection Financial regulation Company control Shareholders Company ownership Italy |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors. The results suggest that there id poor governance, as measured by a low sensitivity of turnover to performance and a low Q ratio, when the controlling shareholders are also top executives, the control is fully in the hands of one shareholder and is not shared by a set of core sharewholders, and the controlling shareholders own less than 50 % of the firm's cash-flow rights. |
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