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Author:Bogetoft, P.
Title:Parallelism in information production: moral hazard and relative performance evaluations
Journal:Management Science
1993 : APR, VOL. 39:4, p. 448-457
Index terms:MORAL HAZARD
PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
INFORMATION
Language:eng
Abstract:The author analyses how to design incentive schemes for agents producing information. The agents may, for example , be division managers, market researchers, OR consultants, financial analysts, corporate auditors, research scientists or political pollsters. The author shows that an agent should be compensated more for making a correct rather than an incorrect prediction, and for agreeing rather than disagreeing with colleagues. Depending on the environment, correctness should be compensated more or less than agreement.
SCIMA record nr: 108535
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