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| Author: | Brennan, G. Kliemt, H. |
| Title: | Finite lives and social institutions |
| Journal: | Kyklos
1994 : VOL. 47:4, p. 551-571 |
| Index terms: | DECISION THEORY GAME THEORY DECISION MAKING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR GROUP DECISION MAKING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | We will illustrate in this paper that subjecting individual to collective decision making may in fact extend the time horizon in ways inaccessible for individuals. We will pro- pose a coalition structure (specifically an age-distribution of membership and a distribution of rewards) that is conduc- tive to this task. What is an offer is a minimalist theory of 'corporate action' with potential applications ranging from political party formation to the theory of the firm. Individuals can be risk-loving (pace Knight); team producti- on might be less efficient than individual production (pace Alchian/Demsetz); market-type relations may have lower transactions costs than command relations (pace Coase) - and still the formation of and commitment to teams/coalitions may be advantageous for rational individuals who live finite lives and know when their end will come. |
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