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| Author: | Winton, A. |
| Title: | Costly state verification and multiple investors: the role of seniority |
| Journal: | Review of Financial Studies
1995 : SPRING, VOL. 8:1, p. 91-124 |
| Index terms: | LAW INVESTORS ROLES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Many financial claims specify fixed maximum payments, varying seniority, and absolute priority for more senior investors. These features are motivated in a model where a firm's manager contracts with several investors and firm output can only be verified privately at a cost. Debt-like contracts of varying seniority generally dominate symmetric contracts, and, when investors are risk neutral, it is optimal to use debt-like contracts where more senior claims have absolute priority over more junior claims. |
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