search query: @author Beaudry, P. / total: 5
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| Author: | Beaudry, P. Poitevin, M. |
| Title: | Competitive screening in financial markets when borrowers can recontract |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
1995 : JUL, VOL. 62:3(212), p. 401-424 |
| Index terms: | FINANCE COMPETITION ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how the possibility of recontracting affects the financing of projects when an entrepreneur is privately informed about the distribution of returns. The authors consider a game where an entrepreneur solicits initial financing for a project from competing uninformed financiers. Once the project is undertaken, but before its returns are realized, the entrepreneur can solicit additional financial contracts from competing financiers. |
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